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THE HISTORY OF A MARYLAND TITLE: A
CONVEYANCER'S ROMANCE RENEWED
URIEL H. CROCKER
AS RETOLD BY DAVID H. FISHMAN*
We live in a time of law reform. Many who cherish the old and
the traditional believe that the law of real property should be a bastion
of the older approach and of the "old learning." Some say that reform
of the law of real property is "a Herculean task, beyond the power of
contemporary mortals," and that "no person, no force strong enough"
is competent to tackle the job.' In Maryland, however, there has been
much change in the body of property law in recent years; over the past
century, many areas of the law of real property have changed beyond
recognition. The change has been gradual, but persistent. Even with-
out conscious broad-scale reform on the English model of the early
1920's, Maryland has, bit by bit, altered the original mass of land law
as received in this state. It is only rarely that the old learning jumps up
to bite the unsuspecting citizen (and his lawyer!).
In 1875, Uriel H. Crocker, a member of the Boston Bar,2 published
an article entitled "The History of a Title: A Conveyancer's Ro-
mance"3 in the American Law Review. 4 The article is a fictional ac-
count of the title to a parcel of property in Boston and the operation of
various obscure principles of real property law which resulted in multi-
ple and unexpected changes of ownership of the property over a very
© Copyright David H. Fishman, 1983.
* A.B. 1959, Johns Hopkins Univ.; LL.B. 1963, Harvard University School of Law.
Member of the Maryland Bar. Partner, Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hol-
lander, Baltimore, Maryland. The author acknowledges with thanks the assistance of Pro-
fessor Russell R. Reno in clarifying some of the more difficult historical points in the first
part of this article.
1. Dukeminier, Cleansing the Stables o/ Property: A River Found at Last, 65 IowA L.
REv. 151, 151 (1979); see also Hartogensis, Maryland Statutory Mod'4cauions ofthe Common
Law o/Real Property, I MD. L. REv. 239 (1936) (discussing reform of Maryland real prop-
erty law).
2. Uriel H. Crocker (1832 - 1902) was born in Boston, graduated from Harvard, and
practiced law in Boston. He authored Notes on Common Forms and Notes on the Public
Statutes ofMassachusetts. 1 WHO WAS WHO 277 (1968).
3. Crocker, The History of a Title: A Conveyancer's Romance, 10 AM. L. REv. 60
(1875).
4. The American Law Review was published in New York from 1866 to 1940. It was
known as the American Law Review from October 1866 to July 1879, the U.S. Law Review
from July 1879 to December 1939, and the New York Law Review from December 1939 to
December 1940, at which time it ceased publication.
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few years. I first happened upon this article though a citation in Casner
and Leach's casebook on real property. 5 I read it again while preparing
a chapter on title insurance for a book on Maryland residential real
property transactions,6 and thought it would be useful in an analysis of
the evolution of Maryland real property law over the last century. Ac-
cordingly, I here retell the history of this title, only moving the locale
from Boston to Baltimore, setting it in the period from 1865 to 1881,
rather than 1860 to 1875, replacing references to Massachusetts law
with citations to appropriate Maryland statutes, texts, and decisions,
and making minor changes in the tale to accommodate differences be-
tween Massachusetts and Maryland law. The story, as relocated and
updated, is set forth as a narrative interrupted bypassages detailing the
evolution of the principles of Maryland real property law that are perti-
nent to the story. Here, then, begins the tale:
Of the locality of the parcel of real estate, the history of the title of
which it is proposed to relate, it may be sufficient to say that it lies in
the city of Baltimore within the limits of the territory ravaged by the
great Clay Street fire on July 25, 1873. 7 In 1865, this parcel of land was
in the undisturbed possession of Mr. William Ingalls, who referred his
title to it to the will of his father, Mr. Henry Ingalls, who died in 1835.
Mr. Ingalls, the elder, had been a very wealthy citizen of Baltimore;
and when he made his will a few years before his death, he owned this
parcel of real estate, worth about $50,000, and possessed, in addition,
personal property and some small parcels of real property to the
amount of between $200,000 and $300,000. By his will he specifically
devised this parcel of land to his wife, for life, and upon her death to
his only child, the William Ingalls before mentioned, in fee. His will
further directed his executor to pay to two nephews, William and Ar-
thur Jones, the sum of $25,000 each to be charged against the residue of
the estate, both real and personal. He also gave the large residue of his
property to his son, William. After the date of his will, however, Mr.
Henry Ingalls engaged in some unfortunate speculations and lost most
of his land holdings; and upon the settlement of his estate the residue of
his real and personal property proved to be barely sufficient for the
payment of his debts, and the nephews got no portion of their legacies.
5. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 897 n.16 (2d ed. 1969).
6. MARYLAND INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF LAWYERS,
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (1981).
7. The Clay Street fire was the largest conflagration in Baltimore prior to the Great
Fire of 1904. It received broad coverage in the national press. See, e.g., Frank Leslie's
Illustrated Weekly, Aug. 9, 1873, at 1.
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The large parcel of real estate we are concerned with, however, af-
forded to the widow a comfortable income, which enabled her during
her life to support herself in a respectable manner.
Upon her death, in 1850, the son entered into possession of the
estate, which had gradually increased in value; and he had been en-
joying for fifteen years a handsome income derived therefrom, when he
was one day surprised to hear that the two cousins, whom his father
had benevolently remembered in his will, had advanced a claim that
this real estate should be sold by his father's executor, and the proceeds
applied to the payment of their legacies. This claim, now first made
thirty years after the death of his father, was of course a great surprise
to Mr. Ingalls. He had entertained the popular idea that twenty years'
possession effectually cut off all claims. Here, however, were parties,
after thirty years' undisputed possession by his mother and himself, set-
ting up in 1865 a claim arising out of the will of his father, that will
having been probated in 1835. Nor had Mr. Ingalls ever dreamed that
the legacies given to his cousins could in any way have precedence over
the specific devise of the parcel of real estate to himself. It was, as a
matter of common sense, so clear that his father had intended by his
will first to provide for his wife and son, and then to make a generous
gift out of the residue of his estate to his nephews, that during the thirty
years that had elapsed since his death it had never occurred to anyone
to suggest any other disposal of the property than that which had been
actually made. Upon consulting with counsel, however, Mr. Ingalls
learned that although the time within which most actions might be
brought was limited to a specified number of years,8 there was no such
limitation affecting the bringing of an action to recover a legacy.
This advice of Mr. Ingalls' counsel was confirmed as correct by the
Court ofAppeals only afew years later in Ogle v. Tayloe 9 which held
that "legacies are not barred by the statute of limitations, " and refused to
apply laches on thefacts." The law in Maryland continued to be suchfor
a while. " As to actions against administrators directly, a statute of limita-
8. See Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 16, § 1 (1623) (limitations on the recovery of
land are 20 years); 2 J. ALEXANDER, BRmsTH STATUrES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND *446;
Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Md. 307, 325, 56 A. 1017, 1025 (1904) (land held by adverse
possession).
9. 49 Md. 158, 176 (1878).
10. Id at 176. Ogle's suit was filed in 1872 for a legacy under the will of a testator who
died in 1844. The trial court rendered its decision in 1877, but the opinion on appeal does
not indicate the reasons for the six-year delay in the lower court.
11. See Constable v. Camp, 87 Md. 173, 178, 39 A. 807, 808 (1898) (statute of limitations
inapplicable because property in essence was held in trust, but laches barred the plaintifi's
case).
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tions applied'2 Now, however, bothpersonal representatives and heirs are
protected by a statute of limitations.
Mr. Ingalls also learned that as he was an only child, and as his
father's will gave him, after his mother's death, the same estate that he
would have taken by inheritance had there been no will, the law looked
upon the devise to him as void, and deemed him to have taken the
estate by descent. What he had supposed to be a specific devise of the
estate to him was then a void devise, or no devise at all; and his parcel
of real estate, being in the eye of the law simply a part of an undevised
residue, was of course liable to be sold for the payment of those lega-
cies contained in his father's will which were expressly made charges
on the residuary real estate! It was an asset which the executor was
bound to apply to that purpose. This exact point had been determined
in the then recent case of Mitchell v. Mitchell. 4
This is but one manifestation of the "'Doctrine of Worthier Title"
which ispresumably still in force in Maryland when the testator leaves one
heir. 15
Thus, Mr. Ingalls was finally compelled to see the estate, the un-
disputed possession of which he had enjoyed for so many years, sold at
auction by the executor of his father's will for $135,000, not quite
enough to pay the legacies to his cousins, which legacies, with interest
12. See Biays v. Roberts, 68 Md. 510, 514, 13 A. 366, 368 (1888) (statute of limitations
begins running upon filing of final account); 2 P. SYKES, PROBATE LAW & PRACTICE § 1027
(1956).
13. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 10-103 (1974) states:
(a) Proceedings Against Personal Representative. - If no action or proceeding
involving the personal representative is pending one year after the close of the estate
pursuant to § 10-101, the personal representative shall be discharged from any claim or
demand of any interested person ....
(b) Claims Agaist Heirs and Legatees. - Except as provided in §§ 10-102
and 11-109, the right of a person seeking to recover property improperly distributed, or
the value of it, from a person to whom property has been distributed is forever barred at
the later of
(1) Three years from the death of decedent, or
(2) One year from time of distribution of the property ....
14. 21 Md. 244, 253-54 (1864).
15. Gilpin v. HoUingsworth, 3 Md. 190, 192 (1852); Donnelly v. Turner, 60 Md. 81, 84
(1883); see generally Reno, The Doctrine of Worthier Title as Applied in Maryland, 4 MD. L.
REv. 50, 55 (1939); E. MILLER, CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS IN MARYLAND § 79 (1927); Bos-
tick, Loosening the Grip of the Dead Hand- Shall We Abolish Legal Future Interests in Land?,
32 VAND. L. REv. 1061, 1075-78 (1979) (discussing this doctrine). The doctrine rarely has
appeared in Maryland in this century, see Stiller, Russell A Reno, Sr.: Teacher and Scholar,
34 MD. L. REv. 225, 242 (1974) (no reported Maryland cases from 1939 to 1974), but "this
lack of judicial activity should not lull the practitioner into thinking that the doctrine has no
modern significance." Id Although reported cases are rare, the Court of Appeals has used
the doctrine as a rule of construction. See, e.g., Allen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 177 Md.
26, 7 A.2d 180 (1939).
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from the expiration of one year after the testator's death, amounted at
the time of the sale in 1866 to $143,000. The Messrs. Jones themselves
purchased the estate at the sale, deeming the purchase a good invest-
ment of the amount of their legacies, and Mr. Ingalls instituted a sys-
tem of stricter economy in his domestic expenses, and pondered much
on the uncertainty of the law and the mutability of human affairs.
By one of those curious coincidences that so often occur, Messrs.
William and Arthur Jones had scarcely begun to enjoy the increased
supply of pocket money afforded them by the rents of their newly ac-
quired property, when they each received one morning a summons to
appear before the Superior Court of Baltimore City, "to answer unto
John Bolton in an action of ejectment," the premises described in the
writ being their newly acquired estate.
The Messrs. Jones were at first rather startled by this unexpected
proceeding; but as they had, when they received their deed from Mr.
Ingalls' executor, taken the precaution to have the title to their estate
examined by a conveyancer, who had reported that he had carried his
examination as far back as the beginning of the century, and had found
the title perfectly clear and correct, they took courage, and waited for
further developments. It was not long, however, before the facts upon
which the action of ejectment had been founded were made known. It
appeared that for some time prior to 1750 the estate had belonged to
one John Buttolph, who died in that year, leaving a will in which he
devised the estate "to my brother Thomas, and, if he shall die without
issue, then I give the same to my brother William." Thomas Buttolph
had held the estate until 1775, when he died, leaving an only daughter,
Mary, at that time the wife of Timothy Bolton. Mrs. Bolton held the
estate until 1786, when she died, leaving two sons and a daughter. This
estate she devised to her daughter, who subsequently, in 1810, con-
veyed it to Mr. Henry Ingalls, before mentioned. Peter Bolton, the old-
est son of Mrs. Bolton, was a non-compos mentis, but lived until the
year 1859, when he died at the age of 75. He left no children, having
never been married.
John Bolton, the plaintiff in the action of ejectment, was the oldest
son of John Bolton, the second son of Mrs. Mary Buttolph Bolton, and
the basis of the title set up by him was substantially as follows. He
claimed that under the decision in Dallam v. Dallam's Lessee,'6 the will
of John Buttolph had given to Thomas Buttolph an estate tail, the law
construing the intention of the testator to have been that the estate
should belong to Thomas Buttolph and to his issue as long as such issue
16. 7 H. & J. 220, 236 (Md. 1826).
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should exist, but that upon the failure of such issue, whenever such
failure might occur, whether at the death of Thomas or at any subse-
quent time, the estate should go to William Buttolph.
In 1750, the date of John Buttoiph's death, the words "die without
issue" were construed to mean indefinitefalure to issue at any time in the
future, and thus equivalent to the words "heirs of his body, " thus creating
a fee tail general estate. In 1862, the General Assembly provided that
such words in a will should be construed to mean definitefailure, at the
death of the first taker.7 The same provision as to deeds was later en-
acted 8 Thus, after 1862, Thomas would have taken afee simple estate
under the wording of John Buttolph's will Thomas'fee simple, however,
would have been subject to a g#? over to his brother William if Thomas
had died without issue. 19 Because he did not die without issue, this gift
over, called an "executory interest," failed, and a fee simple absolute
would have vested in Thomas' daughter, Mary, by his will This appar-
ently was the construction placed on the will of John Buttolph by the law-
yer who examined the titlefor Henry Ingalls when he purchased the land
from the daughter of Mary Bolton in 1810.20
It had also been decided in Chelton v. Henderson ,2' and Smith v.
Smith,22 that prior to the Act to Direct Descents of 178623 an estate tail
did not descend in Maryland, like other real estate, to all the children
of the deceased owner in equal shares, but, according to the old English
rule of primogeniture, exclusively to the oldest son, if any, and to the
daughters only in default of any son;2 4 and it had been further recog-
nized in the landmark case of Newton v. Grffith25 that prior to the Act
17. 1862 Md. Laws ch. 161, superseded by MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-410
(1974).
18. 1886 Md. Laws ch. 236, superseded by MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-113 (1974).
19. Dallam v. Dallam's Lessee, 7 H. & J. 220, 244 (Md. 1826); Gambrill v. Forest Grove
Lodge, 66 Md. 17, 27-28, 5 A. 548, 550-51 (1886); E. MILLER, supra note 15, § 365, at 1026
n.3.
20. See Note, Construction of the Phrase "Death Without Issue" and Similar Terms, I1
MD. L. REV. 25 (1950).
21. 9 Gill 432, 437 (Md. 1850).
22. 2 H. & J. 314, 318 (Md. 1806).
23. 1786 Md. Laws ch. 45, amended by 1820 Md. Laws ch. 191.
24. Smith v. Smith, 2 H. & J. 314, 318 (1808); E. MILLER, supra note 15, at 263 n.1;
Hartogensis, supra note 1, at 242. But estates tail not converted to fee simple by the Act to
Direct Descents continued to descend by primogeniture. Eg., Wickes v. Wickes, 98 Md.
307, 56 A. 1017 (1904) (descent of an estate in fee tail in 1869 was to the eldest son to the
exclusion of seven other children); see generally T. ATmINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
WILLS 23-36 (2d ed. 1953) (law of primogeniture).
25. 1 H. & G. 111, 130-32 (Md. 1827); see Josetti v. McGregor, 49 Md. 202, 211-15
(1878) (discussing Newton). Miller devotes a full section to the case. See E. MILLER, SUpra
note 15, § 366, at 1028-29.
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to Direct Descents, an estate tail could not be devised or in any way
affected by the will of a tenant in tail.26
The Act to Direct Descents of 1786 virtually abolished estates tail
general (i e., a grant to A and the heirs of his body). Any remaining
doubt as to this result was removed by the General Assembly in 1820.27
Estates tail special (i e., a grant to A and the heirs of his body borne by
Mrs. A), however, continued to be possible in Maryland28 until 1916. In
that year, estates tail special were converted by statute into estates in fee
simple 29
Mr. John Bolton claimed then that the estate tail given by the will
of John Buttolph to Thomas Buttolph had descended at the death of
Thomas to his only child, Mary Bolton; that at her death in 1786, in-
stead of passing, as had been supposed at the time by virtue of her will,
to her daughter, that will had been wholly without effect upon the es-
tate, which had, in fact, descended to her oldest son, Peter Bolton. Pe-
ter Bolton had indeed been disseized in 1810, if not before, by the acts
of his sister in taking possession of and conveying away the estate; but,
as he was a non-compos mentis during the whole of his long life, the
Statute of Limitations did not begin to run against him. His heir in tail,
namely, John Bolton, the oldest son of his then deceased brother, John,
26. Laidler v. Young's Lessee, 2 H. & J. 69, 71 (1807). Furthermore, prior to 1782, fee
tail estates could only be disentailed by the tenant in tail suffering a "Common Recovery," a
fictitious law suit resulting in the conveyance of a fee simple absolute estate to the plaintiff
and leaving a worthless judgment for the value of the land for the benefit of the future "heirs
of the body." See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MARYLAND ANNOTATIONS TO RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY § 79 (1943); R. VENABLE, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND LEASEHOLD
ESTATES IN MARYLAND 15 (1892). After that date, see 1782 Md. Laws, ch. 23, the law
authorized the disentailing of land by an ordinary conveyance. This statute is now codified
as MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-102 (1974).
27. 1820 Md. Laws ch. 191. After this statute all estates tail general descended as fee
simple estates to both male and female issue. The estate tail was, therefore, defeated.
28. See R. VENABLE, supra note 25, at 16 (1892). A grant to A and his heirs, male or
female, is an estate tail special. Pennington v. Pennington, 70 Md. 418, 435-36, 17 A. 329,
329 (1889).
29. 1916 Md. Laws ch. 325, stated: "If any person seized of an estate in lands, tenements
or hereditaments, lying in this State, in fee simple, fee simple conditional, or in fee tail,
general or special, shall die intestate thereof, said lands, tenements or hereditaments shall
descend in fee simple .... "
The successors to the 1916 statute appear in the Real Property and Estates & Trust
Codes. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-102 (1974) ("Any person seized of an estate
tail, in possession, reversion, or remainder, in any land, tenement, or hereditament may
grant or sell it in the form of a grant as if he were seized of an estate in fee simple and the
grant is good and available, to all intents and purposes, against every person whom the
grantor might debar by any mode of common recovery, or by any other means."); MD. EST.
& TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-408 (1974) ("Unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the
will, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is
the subject of the legacy.").
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was allowed by the Statute of 21 James I, ch. 16, § 11 (1623), in force in
Maryland,3" to bring his action within ten years after his uncle Peter's
death. As these ten years did not expire until 1869, this action, brought
in 1868, was seasonably commenced; and it was prosecuted with suc-
cess, judgment in his favor having been recovered by John Bolton in
1869.
The correctness of this decision and analysis was recognized by the
Court of Appeals onl'y afew years later in Wickes v. Wickes. The Brit-
ish statute has since been repealed in Maryland,32 and the ten yearperiod
after removal of the disability is now usually three years. 33
The case of Bolton v. Jones was naturally a subject of remark
among the legal profession; and it happened to occur to one of the
younger members of that profession that it would be well to improve
some of his idle moments by studying up the facts of this case in the
Baltimore City Land Record Office. Curiosity promoted this gen-
tleman to extend his investigation beyond the facts directly involved in
the case, and to trace the title of Mr. John Buttolph back to an earlier
date. He found that Mr. Buttolph had purchased the estate in 1730 of
one Hosea Johnson, to whom it had been conveyed in 1710 by Benja-
min Parsons. The deed from Parsons to Johnson, however, conveyed
the land to Johnson simply, without any mention of his "heirs"; and the
young lawyer, having only recently completed his reading in the area
of real property law preparatory to being called to the Bar, was familiar
with the statute enacted in Maryland in 185631 which for the first time
eliminated the common-law requirement that a fee simple estate could
be created only by use of the word "heirs." 35 He thus perceived that
Johnson took under this deed only a life estate in the granted premises,
and that at his death the premises reverted to Parsons or to his heirs.
Prior to 1856,36 a deed which omitted the word "heirs" in the grant-
30. See 2 J. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, *446, *460.
31. 98 Md. 307, 326, 56 A. 1017, 1025 (1904). Wickes was decided in 1904, but con-
cerned an entail created in 1732. It received some notoriety when the decision was rendered
by the Kent County Circuit Court in 1903. An Entail Created in 1732 Still Holds Good -
Decision in Kent County - Case of Charlotte A. Strong and Others Against Robert Wickes,
Involving Right to LandedProperty, The Sun (Baltimore) Feb. 27, 1903, at 10, col. 1. I doubt
that The Sun would find space for this story today.
32. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-115 (1974).
33. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-201(a) (1980) (the lesser of three years or
the applicable period of limitations after the date the disability is removed).
34. 1856 Md. Laws ch. 154.
35. 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 27 (1936); accord Hofsass v. Mann, 74 Md. 400, 22
A. 65 (1891).
36. 1856 Md. Laws ch. 154, superseded by MD. REAL PROP CODE ANN. § 4-105 (1974).
See E. MILLER, supra note 15, § 100, at 276 n.8.
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ing clause created only a lfe estate."
The young lawyer, being of an enterprising spirit, thought it would
be well to follow out the investigation suggested by his discovery. He
found, to his surprise, that while Hosea Johnson had conveyed the
property to John Buttolph in 1730, he did not die until 1786, the estate
having, in fact, been purchased by him for a residence when he was
twenty-one years of age, and about to be married. He had lived upon it
for twenty years, but had then moved his residence to another part of
Baltimore County, and sold the estate, as we have seen, to Mr. But-
tolph. When Mr. Johnson died, in 1786, at the age of ninety-seven, it
chanced that the sole party entitled to the reversion, as heir of Benja-
min Parsons, was a young woman, his granddaughter, aged eighteen,
and just married. This young lady and her husband lived, as some-
times happens, to celebrate their diamond wedding anniversary in
1861, but died during that year. As she had been under the legal disa-
bility of coverture from the time when her right of entry upon the es-
tate, as heir of Benjamin Parsons, first accrued in 1786, at the
termination of Johnson's life estate, the provision of the Statute of Lim-
itations, before cited, gave her heirs ten years after her death within
which to bring their action.
"Co verture, " ie., marriage, was a disability which tolled the period of
limitations prior to 1894.38
These heirs of Benjamin Parsons' granddaughter proved to be
three or four people of small means, residing in remote parts of the
United States. What arrangements the young lawyer made with these
parties and also with a Mr. John -Sharpe, a speculating moneyed man
of Baltimore, who was supposed to have furnished certain necessary
funds, he was wise enough to keep carefully to himself. Suffice it to say
that in 1870 an action was brought by the heirs of Benjamin Parsons to
recover from Bolton the land which he had just recovered from Wil-
liam and Arthur Jones. In this action the plaintiffs were successful, and
they had no sooner been put in formal possession of the estate than
they conveyed it, now worth a couple of hundred thousand dollars, to
the aforesaid Mr. John Sharpe, who was popularly supposed to have
obtained in this case, as he usually did in all financial operations in
which he was concerned, the lion's share of the plunder. The Parsons
37. E.g., Hofsass v. Mann, 74 Md. 400, 407, 22 A. 65, 66 (1891) (1842 deed omitting
"heirs" giving grantee a life estate only); see also Hartogensis, supra note 1, at 253; NOTES
ON TITLES § 78 (Title Guarantee & Trust Co. 1903) (citing Maryland cases).
38. 1894 Md. Laws ch. 661. See Amey v. Cockey, 73 Md. 297, 306, 20 A. 1071, 1073
(1890) (coverture tolled time period for avoiding a deed until a reasonable time after disabil-
ity ceased).
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heirs, probably, realized very little from the results of the suit; but the
young lawyer obtained sufficient remuneration to establish him as a
brilliant speculator in suburban lands, second mortgages, and land pat-
ent rights. Mr. Sharpe had been but a short time in possession of his
new estate when the great fire of July, 1873, swept over it. He was,
however, a most energetic citizen, and the ruins were not cold before he
was at work rebuilding. He bought an adjoining lot in order to in-
crease the size of his estate, the whole of which was by early in 1875
covered by an elegant building, conspicuous on the front of which
could be seen his initials, "J.S.," cut in the stone.
While the estate which had once belonged to Mr. William Ingalls,
was passing from one person to another in the bewildering manner we
have endeavored to describe, Mr. Ingalls had himself, for a time,
looked on in amazement. It finally occurred to him, however, that he
would go to the root of this matter of the title. He employed a skillful
conveyancer to trace that title back, if possible, to Lord Baltimore. The
result of this investigation was that it appeared that the parcel which he
had himself owned, together with the additional parcel bought and ad-
ded to it by Sharpe, had, in 1690 constituted one parcel, which was then
the "possession" of one "Maudid Engle," who subsequently, in 1695,
under the name of "Mauditt Engles," conveyed it to John Carroll, on
the express condition that no building should ever be erected on a cer-
tain portion of the rear of the premises conveyed. Now it had so hap-
pened that this portion of these premises had never been built upon
before the great fire, but Mr. Sharpe's new building had covered the
whole of the forbidden ground. It was evident, then, that the condition
had been broken; that the breach had occurred so recently that the
right to enforce a forfeiture was not barred by the statute, and could
not be deemed to have been waived by any neglect or delay; and that
consequently, under the decision in Dolan v. Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore,39 a forfeiture of the estate for breach of this condition could
now be enforced if the true parties entitled by descent and by residuary
devises under the original "Engle" or "Engles" could only be found. It
occurred to Mr. Ingalls, however, that this name, "Engles," bore a cer-
tain similarity in sound to his own; and as he had heard that during the
early years after the settlement of this country, great changes in the
spelling of names had been brought about, he instituted an inquiry into
his own genealogy, the result of which was, in brief, that he found he
could prove himself to be the identical person entitled, as a remote heir
of Maudid Engle, to enforce, for breach of the condition in the old
39. 4 Gill 395, 404-06 (Md. 1846).
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deed of 1695, the forfeiture of the estate now in the possession of John
Sharpe.
The correctness of Mr. Ingalls' theory was confirmed only shortly
thereafter by the Court ofAppeals in Reed v. Stouffer 4° Thefolfeiture of
an estate upon breach of a condition in the grant creating the estate was
long recognized in Maryland,4' until the legislature required the periodic
reregistration of restrictions and conditions in order to keep them alive.42
This statute is in keeping with a general trend of reform in this area of the
law all over the country.4 3
When Mr. Sharpe heard of these facts, he felt that a retributive
Nemesis was pursuing him. He lost the usual pluck and buUdog deter-
mination with which he had been accustomed to fight at the law all
claims against him, whether just or unjust. He consulted the spirits;
and they rapped out the answer that he must make the best settlement
he could with Mr. Ingalls, or he would infallibly lose all his fine estate
- not only that part which Mr. Ingalls had originally held, and which
he had obtained for almost nothing from the heirs of Benjamin Parsons
- but also the adjoining parcel for which he had paid its full value,
together with the elegant building which he had erected at a cost ex-
ceeding the whole value of the land. Mr. Sharpe believed in the spirits;
they had made a lucky guess once in answering an inquiry from him;
he was getting old; he had worked like a steam-engine during a long
and busy life, but now his health and his digestion were giving out; and
when the news of Mr. Ingalls' claim reached his ears, he became, in a
word, demoralized. He instructed his lawyer to make the best settle-
ment of the matter that he could, and a settlement was soon effected by
which the whole of Mr. Sharpe's parcel of land in the burnt district was
conveyed to Mr. Ingalls, who gave back to Mr. Sharpe a mortgage for
the whole amount which the latter had expended in the erection of his
building, together with what he had paid for the parcel added by him
to the original lot. Mr. Sharpe, not liking to have any thing to remind
him of his one unfortunate speculation, soon sold and assigned this
40. 56 Md. 236, 253-55 (1881) (title to property immediately vests in grantor's heirs
upon violation of limiting condition of deed).
41. See 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44, comment e and illus. 7 (1936); AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 26, § 56; see also Report of the Special Committee on Possibilities
of Reverter and Rights of Entry (1968) (summary of Maryland law as of 1968), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF MARYLAND, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1969
480-92 (1968).
42. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 6-101 to 6-105 (1981).
43. See Chaffin, Reverters, Rights of Entry and Executory Interests: Semantic Confusion
and the Tying Up of Land, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 321 n.71 (1962) (legislation in other
states limiting time periods for rights of entry and possibilities of reverter).
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mortgage to the Maryland Life Insurance Company; and as the well-
known counsel of that institution has now examined and passed the
title, we may presume that there are in it no more flaws remaining to be
discovered.
In conclusion, we may say that Mr. William Ingalls, after having
been for some ten years a reviler of the law, especially of that portion of
it which relates to the title to real estate, is now inclined to look more
complacently upon it, being again in undisturbed and undisputed pos-
session of his old estate, now worth much more than before, and in the
receipt therefrom of an ample income which will enable him to pass the
remainder of his days in comfort, if not in luxury. But, though Mr.
Ingalls is content with the final result of the history of his title, those
lawyers who are known as "conveyancers" are by no means happy
when they contemplate that history, for it has tended to impress upon
them how full of pitfalls is the ground upon which they are accustomed
to tread, and how extensive is the knowledge and how great the care
required of all who travel over it; and they now look more disgusted
than ever, when, as so often happens, they are requested to "just step
over" to the Record Office and "run down" a title; and are informed
that the title is a very simple one, and will take only a few minutes; and
that So-and-so, "a very careful man," did it in less than half an hour
last year, and found it all right, and that his charge was five dollars.
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